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response. Failing barriers provided several pathways for the incidents to occur. Therefore, 
hierarchical risk management models could not adequately accommodate dynamic teaching 
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need to make improvements to their risk management systems and work operations. Laboratory 
incidents continue to occur at a high frequency. Therefore, effective methods on how to teach 
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Many sources of hazards can be present in the workplace. Specifically, workers who are 
exposed to hazardous chemicals can experience serious acute and adverse health effects. It is a 
very difficult task to keep track of the intrinsic hazards that are associated with individual 
chemicals. More than 142 million substances can be found in the Chemical Abstract Registry. 
Safety Data Sheets are available for all those chemicals. All registered substances must be 
classified according to the Globally Harmonized System. There are nine hazard categories, 
corresponding to different physical and health hazards. Additionally, hundreds of hazard and 
precautionary statements are included in the Globally Harmonized System (Globally 
Harmonized System, Rev. 7).  
In a typical laboratory setting, plenty of hazardous substances are used for a variety of 
procedures. A long-term study conducted by Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
evaluated data of emergency room events involving hazardous chemicals from nine states. 
Between 1999 and 2008, 57,975 of those incidents occurred, of which, 4,621 resulted in 15,506 
injured people. Most of the injured people worked in the chemical industry (1,753). Surprisingly, 
academia ranked second with 1,562 injuries (Hill, 2016). The U.S. Chemical Safety Board 
published a comprehensive list of incidents that involved hazardous chemicals and occurred in 
laboratories. They included data from January 2001 until July 2018 (APPENDIX). The 
information was received from multiple sources, including the news media and the U.S. Coast 
Guard’s National Response Center. Not all incidents did undergo a secondary verification by the 
CSB and the agency does not exclude that additional laboratory may have occurred during the 
timespan for which the incident data was collected. The CSB list accounts for a total of 261 
incidents; 49 occurred in laboratories of businesses and industries. These resulted in a total of 92 
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injuries and nine fatalities. The worst case had four fatalities and 14 injuries. For primary 
educational facilities (middle schools, high schools, and one exploration museum), 65 incidents 
took place which resulted in a total of 209 injuries and no fatalities. One high school had 17 
injuries reported for a single instance. The greatest number of incidents was reported for colleges 
and universities. At those institutions, 147 incidents happened and resulted in a total of 197 
injuries and one fatality. One person died at a university while 13 people were injured at a 
college in just one occurrence. The Chemical Safety Board conducted investigations for five 
incidents from the comprehensive list. Three of the investigations were done for educational 
facilities (a discovery museum, a high school, and a university), one for an industrial facility, and 
one for a church (Chemical Safety Board, 2018). 
Incidents involving hazardous chemicals demonstrate the necessity that any laboratory 
should have an effective safety and risk management concept. Several different approaches for 
establishing a safe laboratory environment are possible. Administrative and engineering controls 
should be put in place; all people working inside the laboratory should receive adequate training 
and should be provided with access to safety-relevant information. Emergency drills, an 
emergency response plan, and a chemical hygiene plan are integral parts of a safe laboratory 
environment. Appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) should be provided to everyone 
working inside the laboratory, as well as visitors. New procedures and protocols should be 
evaluated through a job hazard analysis (JHA). Procedures need to be constantly reviewed. The 
functionality of hazard controls and safety barriers needs to be assured. A safe laboratory 
environment cannot be based on fixed plans and controls. The risk management needs to involve 
over time and in accordance with the needs of the institute. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that knowledge about chemical hazards and risk perception play important roles when it comes 
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to laboratory safety. All the people working in the laboratory should receive appropriate training 
and should frequently be evaluated on their safety knowledge and attitudes. 
 Even though there is sufficient knowledge about the risks of handling hazardous 
materials, institutions often just implement higher levels of control measures when laws and 
regulations require a change. Several barriers between the workers and the hazard would provide 
the best protection for human health. Still, the administration often relies on the solutions that 
seem to be the simplest and most cost-effective on first glance. The consequences can be 
devastating. The great number of examples for laboratory incidents for educational and academic 
institutions shows that tragic events occur with a high frequency. In some cases, the institutions 
improved their risk management systems because they experienced pressure from the public and 
the authorities. Sometimes real change was accomplished. Those improvements can serve as 
examples for laboratory management in general.  
For this master’s thesis, a comprehensive review of several case-studies that involved 
employees and students’ exposure to hazardous materials in academic chemistry laboratories was 
be performed. Risk management systems and their surrounding safety cultures were evaluated. 
The goal was to identify flaws within those systems as well as cultural factors that influenced 
risk control measures from the outside. The purpose of this work was to identify common 
denominators of incidents that occurred inside the chemistry and research facilities of higher 




Safety information and best laboratory practices are very important components of risk 
management programs in chemical laboratories. The literature review section of this paper will 
briefly elaborate on the recommendations, made by the American Chemical Society and 
researchers, on how undergraduate chemistry majors should be trained in regard to chemical 
safety. Next, a short overview of the Globally Harmonized System and selected chemical safety 
resources will be given. Then, the terms hazard and risk are going to be defined. A description of 
hazard controls and the bowtie method, a risk management technique, will be presented. The 
chapter will be concluded with information about comparative case study research and examples 
of what previous research was conducted around the issues with chemical safety in educational 
and academic laboratory settings. 
Education for Professional Chemists  
The American Chemical Society describes knowledge about chemical safety as a skill. It 
is not listed as a requirement of the undergraduate chemistry curriculum. The ACS guidelines 
state that approved programs should promote a safety culture. Students should understand safe 
laboratory practices and how to apply them. Safety awareness should already begin when 
students take their first introductory laboratory courses. Classroom and laboratory discussions 
must stress safe practices. Undergraduate students should learn about proper waste disposal 
techniques, comprehend and comply with safety standards, and understand and use material 
safety data sheets. They should be able to recognize potential chemical and physical hazards in 
the laboratory environment and know how to act in case of an emergency (American Chemical 
Society, 2018). Sigmann published a spiral diagram illustrating the learning evolution of a 
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professional chemist (Figure 1). It depicts the educational journey of an individual as they 
progress from a high school student to a post-doc research chemist (Sigmann, 2018a). 
 
Figure 1. Learning evolution of a professional chemist (Sigmann, 2018a). 
The central arrow represents the summary of knowledge, skills, and abilities a student needs to 
acquire in order to master the requirements for the profession of a chemist. Chemical knowledge, 
laboratory skills, and scientific culture have equal importance for the educational foundation of 
chemists (Sigmann, 2018a). 
Safety resources. There is a variety of resources with chemical safety information 
available to chemists. The Board on Chemical Science and Technology published “Prudent 
Practices in the Laboratory: Handling and Management of Chemical Hazards” (National 
Research Council, 2011). Also, the Globally Harmonized System (GHS) was adopted for the 
United States in 2012. It includes a requirement for manufacturers and distributors of chemicals 
to provide their customers with safety data sheets (SDS) for their products. Therefore, the GHS 
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is very helpful when it comes to the classification and verification of hazards for chemicals 
(Globally Harmonized System, Rev. 7). 
Prudent Practices in the Laboratory. The National Research Council published a book 
that provides specific guidelines on how to implement prudent practices in a chemical laboratory. 
In the beginning, the authors provide a statement that laboratory workers realize the welfare and 
safety of individuals depends on clearly defined safety attitudes for the team but also for each 
worker. Safety cannot only be accomplished by using the right equipment and materials. It is 
influenced by processes and behaviors as well. The participation in the laboratory safety culture 
of habitual risk assessment, experiment planning, and emergency preparedness has the same 
importance as knowledge about the theoretical background of the experiments. Special safety 
considerations should be made for academic laboratories. They should be held accountable to the 
same safety standard as industry and research facilities, but the educators there also have the 
unique responsibility; students should be enabled to develop a lifelong attitude of safety 
consciousness, risk assessment, and prudent laboratory practices.  Safety education should 
already start in primary school and should continue through postdoctoral training.  Every 
student’s first chemistry experiments in high school should cover a proper approach to 
understanding and dealing with the hazards that are associated with chemicals, e. g. 
flammability, reactivity, corrosivity, and toxicity.  Another topic should be appropriate disposal 
of hazardous waste.  When undergraduate chemistry courses are taught, the instructors face the 
challenge of introducing inexperienced students to the chemical laboratory safety culture.  While 
some students might have already received good preparation from their chemistry high school 
course, others might have little to no experience in the laboratory setting. The learning goal is 
that all students can evaluate the wide range of hazards present in the laboratory and apply risk 
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management techniques that are designed to eliminate potential dangers from the work setting. 
Undergraduate teaching assistants, who are often graduate students, should receive specific 
safety instructions from responsible faculty members. Teaching assistants serve as role models. 
Therefore, it is especially important to provide them with the tools and knowledge needed for the 
safe operation of the teaching laboratories. A written manual has proven itself as a very effective 
teaching tool for the laboratory assistants.  It can include sections on the laboratory facilities, 
principles of laboratory safety, assignments during the laboratory sessions, management of 
chemicals, applicable safety rules and regulations, appropriate laboratory attire, PPE, 
departmental policies, emergency preparedness in the event of a fire, chemical spill, or injury. 
The entire faculty of the department should be fully committed to safe laboratory work practices. 
Safety should be a top priority for the educators as they create a foundation for the students later 
entering careers in industrial, governmental, governmental, and health science laboratories. If 
chemical safety is promoted during the undergraduate and graduate years of the students, the 
faculty and staff will have a significant impact on the future. For academic research laboratories, 
the engaged students must receive rigorous and mandatory safety training. Unlike teaching 
laboratories, where well-established experiments are repeated every semester, research often 
makes use of new materials and new methods. Those may pose new unknown hazards. Formal 
safety education for advanced students doing research should be made relevant to the actual 
work procedures. Principal investigators can be held legally accountable for the safety in their 
laboratories. However, this responsibility can be shared. Academic institutions often develop 
hierarchical structure so that the responsibility can be shared.  A shared safety responsibility can 
help transmit the importance of prudent and safe practices. When everyone demonstrates 
leadership and a significant concern about safety, fewer people will get hurt in the laboratory. A 
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partnership between the chemistry department and the environmental health and safety (EHS) 
personnel should be established. If a laboratory facility produces less waste, it will have smaller 
impact on the environment because a smaller quantity of waste needs to be disposed. A source 
reduction usually includes procedural and process alternations that use less material and produce 
less waste.  Options should be discussed with educators and EHS managers (National Research 
Council, 2011).  
Globally Harmonized System. The Globally Harmonized System (GHS) provides a 
uniform system for the hazard classification of chemicals and labeling of chemical containers. 
For the United States, the existing hazard communication standard (29 CFR 1910.1200) was 
changed in accordance with GHS in the year 2012. The committee that created the GHS worked 
for more than a decade and anticipated that with the implementation of the system, the protection 
of human and environmental health would be enhanced, a recognized international framework 
would be created, the need for testing and evaluation would be reduced, and international trade 
of chemicals whose hazards were properly assessed would be facilitated. The GHS includes 
harmonized criteria for the classification of substances according to their physical and health 
hazards and harmonized hazard communication elements for safety data sheets (SDSs) and 
labeling. In the GHS document, it is stated that an integral part of the system is the training of the 
hazard communication users. The key target audience for training includes employees, 
emergency responders, and risk management personnel. Containers of hazardous chemicals 
should always be labeled in accordance with the GHS. This also includes secondary containers in 
the workplace. Figure 2 shows the nine GHS Standard Pictograms (Globally Harmonized System 




Figure 2. GHS Standard Pictograms (GHS Training by Multi-Clean., n.d.). 
A GHS label also includes the signal words “Danger” or “Warning”. “Warning” is often used for 
the less server. Hazard and precautionary statements are a part of the label too. For the 
classification of health and environmental hazards, the following criteria were developed: (1) 
acute toxicity: (2) skin corrosion and irritation; (3) serious eye damage and irritation; (4) 
respiratory or skin sensitization; (5) germ cell mutagenicity; (6) carcinogenicity; (7) reproductive 
toxicity; (8) target organ systemic toxicity; (9) hazards to aquatic life. Physical hazards are 
classified according to the criteria: explosiveness, flammability, oxidizers, pyrophoric, organic 
peroxides, corrosives, gases under pressure, and water-active flammable gases (Silk, 2003).    
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Lists of unique codes for the statements can be found online and are intended for reference 
purposes (Globally Harmonized System, Rev. 7). 
Safety Data Sheets (SDS). In 1968, the first Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDSs) 
communicating chemical hazard was published for the ship building industry (Kaplan, 1986). 
Since 1985, OSHA required chemical manufacturers and distributors to perform hazard 
evaluations and provide MSDSs for their products. OSHA required that the MSDSs contained 
information about: (1) name of manufacturer; (2) chemical and all common names of the 
hazardous components: (3) physical and chemical characteristics; (4) carcinogenicity potential; 
(5) first aid and emergency response; (6) primary routes of intake; (7) OSHA exposure limits and 
toxicity information; (8) physical hazards and reactivity: (9) health hazard data; (10) handling 
and spill clean-up; (11) engineering controls, recommended best practices, personal protective 
equipment (PPE); (12) preparation and dates for review of the MSDS (29 CFR 1910.1200, 
before 2012).  OSHA did not require or provide a standardized format for MSDSs. Therefore, 
many manufacturers used the standard format that was developed by the American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1993 (American National Standards Institute, 1993). This ANSI 
standard contains all of the OSHA-required sections plus four additional sections; (1) toxicology 
information; (2) transportation; (3) safe disposal; and (4) ecological information. As the GHS 
System was adapted for the United States in 2012, MSDSs were renamed Safety Data Sheets 
(SDSs) (Globally Harmonized System, Rev. 7). The new SDSs have the following sections: (1) 
identification; (2) associated hazards;(3) composition; (4) first-aid; (5) fire-fighting measures; (6) 
accidental release measures; (7) storage and handling; (8) exposure control and personal 
protective equipment; 9) chemical and physical properties; (10) stability and reactivity; (11) 
toxicological data; (12) ecological information; (13) disposal considerations; (14) transport; (15) 
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regulations; and (16) further information. The GHS addresses in more detail what information 
should be included for those sections (Silk, 2003) 
Under the Hazard Communication Standard, employers are required to provide 
information to their employees about the hazardous chemicals that are present at the workplace. 
They have to provide training, access to SDSs, and all containers have to be properly labeled. 
Since the manufacturers and distributors of chemicals are required to provide SDSs to their 
customers it is assured that the businesses who receive chemicals have an insight to the relevant 
and important information (Eastlake, Hodson, Geraci & Crawford, 2012). 
Risk Assessment 
A hazard may be an attribute of an activity, a circumstance, or a condition that is able to 
produce undesired events. Risk refers to a product of probability or likelihood for an undesired 
event to occur and the severity of the consequences for that event, as a result of a present hazard. 
Risk assessment includes strategic methods for the prevention of undesired events. Risk 
management addresses what to do about the risks that were identified during the risk assessment 
(Brauer, 2016). In 1983, the U.S. National academy of science published “Risk Assessment in 
the Federal Government: Managing the Process”. In this publication, the four steps of risk 
assessment for chemicals were described as: (1) hazard identification; (2) dose-response 
assessment; (3) exposure assessment; and (4) risk characterization (National Research Council, 
1983). Risk assessment must often rely on inadequate information or the lack of data. Some 
people will take a conservative approach so that risk is not overestimated. Others will use 
comparison techniques for various options. The relative differences between options then 
become more important than absolute risk estimates for the individual approaches. The risk 
assessment criteria differ. For the United States, if there is no proof for a risk being present, 
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people do not see a need for regulation. In Europe it is the opposite; if there is a chance for a risk, 
it is usually not allowed. The risk management process involves the following steps: (1) risk 
identification; (2) risk analysis; (3) elimination or reduction of risk; (4) financing risk; and 
administration of the risk management process. Adverse events can be caused by human error or 
system failures. Hazards can be controlled so that the likelihood of an undesired event is 
decreased. The hierarchy of controls is described in the literature (Brauer, 2016).   
Concepts of error. Human error can be viewed in two different ways: the person 
approach and the systematic approach. The person approach assumes that errors are being made 
because of forgetfulness, inattention, poor motivation, carelessness, negligence, and 
recklessness. Blaming the individual seems to be emotionally more satisfying than targeting 
entire institutions. If an undesired incident occurs, attempts to uncouple a person’s unsafe acts 
from any institutional responsibility are common. This is especially convenient for management. 
The person approach falls short because, without a culture of safety reporting, it is impossible to 
determine the causes of unwanted situations. Errors are often being made by the most skilled and 
most knowledgeable people. Recklessness and poor motivation can, therefore, be excluded. 
Unskilled workers do not have a monopoly on incidents. Undesired situations that seem random 
at first often have recurring patterns. Errors cannot be investigated without looking at the 
systematic context. Recordkeeping needs to include detailed analyses of all mishaps, incidents, 
and near misses. Trust is an integral part of a functioning safety reporting culture. As a 
consequence, the basis of it all is a just culture (Reason, 2000). In 1990, Reason distinguished 
between the two different types of human errors, failure of expertise and lack of expertise. 
Failure of expertise happens when a pre-established plan or solution is applied inappropriately. A 
lack of expertise is when a person is forced to do a task for which they were not able to establish 
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a working routine yet. Figure 3 illustrates Reason’s Swiss cheese model of accident causation 
(Reason, 1990). 
 
Figure 3. Swiss cheese model of accident causation (Reason, 1990). 
The diagram shows a trajectory for an accident “opportunity” (Reason, 1990). Reason’s model 
describes the interactions between system-wide latent conditions, for example, poor safety 
designs and inadequate equipment, inadequate supervision or training, manufacturing defects, 
maintenance defects, and unsafe procedures. According to this model, each level of hazard 
control (defenses) has weaknesses created by the latent conditions or unsafe acts. This creates a 
“window of opportunity” for an undesired event to occur. An accident trajectory is able to breach 
the defenses and cause an incident (Reason, 1990). 
Some researchers believe that most mistakes being made are due to management issues 
not due to lack of skills of the involved workers. Errors by workers can be attributed to poor 
management processes (Brauer, 2016). Deming published research for which he described that 
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an existing process could not be improved from within unless there is a change made to the 
process itself. His approach was to focus on management monitoring the process correctly, 
reducing errors in poorly functioning tasks, and avoiding the necessity for corrections after errors 
occur (Deming, 1981). Figure 4 shows Rasmussen’s risk management framework together with 
the migration of work practices. This illustration was published as part of the book “Human 
Factors Methods and Accident Analysis: Practical Guidance and Case Study Applications”.  The 
authors chose to combine concepts from Rasmussen’s original publication in on picture 
(Rasmussen, 1997 as cited by Walker, Jenkins, Rafferty, Lenné, Stanton & Salmon, 2012). 
 
Figure 4. Risk management framework with the migration of work practices (Rasmussen, 1997 
as cited by Walker et al., 2012). 
Rasmussen explains that accidents are typically waiting to be released. The stage for this is set 
by the different people working within the system and participating in routine work practices. 
The model also describes how work practices evolve over time, and in doing so often cross safe 
work activity boundaries. Economics and productions influence work practices in a way that, 
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after a while, leads to degradation of system barriers and migration of work practices. It is very 
important that the migration of safe work practices does not only occur at the system level where 
the work is performed but on all levels up to the top of the hierarchical structure (Rasmussen, 
1997 as cited by Walker et al., 2012). 
System failures. Changes in design can introduce new hazards to the system. This is 
especially true when a design change introduces a new hazard. During the design and planning 
phase, engineers and others may introduce new hazards for the sites of buildings, operations, and 
environments. A hazard can be the result of a computational error or making poor assumptions 
about how the system will operate (Brauer, 2016). Design errors of structures and equipment can 
lead to acute failures and latent failures for the system.     
Hierarchy of hazard controls. Hierarchical control systems stress the view that those at 
the highest level of the hierarchy are in control. Those at the progressively lower levels have 
accorded levels of authority and control subordinates as instructed by the highest level of 
management (Lintern & Kugler, 2017). A good culture is an integral part of a functioning 
management system.  If a new leader attempts to change the organizational structure of an 
institution, he would first have to erase elements of the old structure that hinder the improvement 
of the organization’s culture. General management skills, as well as insider knowledge, are 
important qualities for personnel in leadership positions. Edgar Schein stated that nowadays a 
gap between practitioners and researchers is observable. There is an increased demand for 
applied knowledge and practical knowledge. Also, organizational cultures have become less 
important. The focus is now on a combination of occupational and national cultures. When 
tackling a business problem, it is important to tackle the cultural root cause first (Mike, 2014). 
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In order to protect workers’ health and safety, an effective risk management system needs to be 
put in place. Risks that are associated with hazardous situations and materials need to be 
controlled. While a great variety of hazards can be present at different workplaces, the hierarchy 
of controls is a general approach to manage risks. Figure 5 shows the pyramid of the hierarchy of 
controls (CDC, 2018). 
 
Figure 5. Hierarchy of Controls (Center for Disease Control, 2018). 
Elimination is the most effective risk control; the hazard is physically removed. 
Substitution replaces the hazard with something else. While both controls are very effective, they 
are also very difficult to implement for already existing processes. If the process is still in 
development, elimination and substitution often can be realized easily and inexpensively.  
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If the higher levels of risk controls cannot be applied, engineering controls can be put in place. 
Those isolate the workers from the hazard. Well-designed engineering controls can be very 
effective in protecting workers and are typically independent from the actions of the workers. 
The initial cost of engineering controls can be high, but over time the costs of operation decrease 
and sometimes costs are even reduced. 
The lowest levels in the hierarchy of controls are administrative controls and PPE. Both 
are used frequently for processes that are not very well controlled. They are inexpensive to 
establish but can be very costly to maintain over time. Both methods require significant effort by 
the affected workers and are known to be less effective than the higher levels of controls (CDC, 
2018). 
Risk Management Techniques 
Several different risk management techniques are discussed in the safety literature. For 
this thesis, the bowtie methodology is described in detail below. 
Bowtie methodology. The Bowtie Method is a risk management technique that can be 
utilized for the analyses and demonstration of causal relationships between hazards and their 
controls. The name of the technique originates from the shape of the diagram which resembles a 
bowtie. The model is said to have been presented for the first time as part of a chemistry lecture 
at the University of Queensland, Australia, in 1979 (The history of bowtie, n.d.). The bowtie is a 
graphical tool that demonstrates an incident scenario and the resulting outcomes. Bowtie 
diagrams can have different variations. Figure 6 shows a typical bowtie diagram 




Figure 6. Bowtie diagram (Dedianous & Fievez, 2006). 
In general, all bowties converge around an event for which control is lost. This event is 
often called the “top event” (Ruijter & Guldenmund, 2016), or “critical event” (Dedianous & 
Fievez, 2006). Threats and causes of the “critical event” are on the left side; they are elements of 
the fault tree. Consequences are on the right side; they are features of the “event tree”. Barriers 
are fundamental elements of the bowtie diagram. They are placed on both sides of the “critical 
event”. The goal for those barriers is to eliminate or inhibit the loss of control on the side of the 
“fault tree” and try to recover or mitigate the loss of control on the side of the “event tree”. 
Additionally, a management system can be added to the bowtie diagram. The management 
system would serve as an additional layer underneath the barriers. It shows how a barrier is 
integrated and how it influences the other features of the bowtie diagram (Ruijter & 
Guldenmund, 2016). 
Comparative Case Study Research 
The UNICEF Office of Research presented an overview of comparative case study 
research in 2014. They explained the following: a case study is an extensive examination of a 
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single case. This can be an incident, a policy, a program, and intervention site, or others. A 
comparative case study involves at least two case studies. It aims to produce more generalizable 
knowledge about causal questions. For example, why programs succeed and other programs fail. 
Comparative case study research is undertaken over time and emphasis’s comparison with and 
across contexts. It can be selected when an experimental design is not feasible to undertake or 
when there is a need for an explanation on how features with the context influence a system.  
Comparative case study research includes the analysis and synthesis of similarities, differences, 
and patterns across two or more cases that share a common focus or goal. For a well-designed 
study, the specific features of each case should be described at the beginning of the study. The 
rationale for the selection of different cases is that all of them should be related to the key 
evaluation questions (KEQ) of the comparative case study. An understanding of each case is 
important for establishing the basis for the analytic framework. As a design option, comparative 
case studies are appropriate when “how” and “why” questions are posed on the outcomes of 
situations, when there is little or no opportunity to influence or control outcomes, and when an 
understanding of the context is seen as being important. The UNICEF Office of Research 
recommends a careful selection of cases is necessary because it has implications for how well 
causality can be addressed for the data synthesis and analysis process Figure 7 shows the 




Figure 7. The logic of comparative case study research (Yin, 2014 as cited in Goodrick, 2014). 
Comparative case study research usually involves six steps that, in an ideal situation 
should be undertaken in the following order: 
1. Definition of the KEQ and the purpose of the study. This sets goals for the study and 




2. Identifying initial theories and objectives as a focus for the comparative case study. 
3. Defining the selection criteria for case studies to be included in the project. 
4. Identification of the methods for evidence collection, analysis, and synthesis across 
the different case studies. 
5. Considerations of alternative explanations for the outcomes of the different cases. 
6. Report on the findings and results of the comparative case study project. 
This sequence provides the opportunity for selecting and testing explanatory evidence 
repeatedly, which is a major difference compared to experimental and quasi-experimental 
research designs (Goodrick, 2014).  In 2017, an innovative approach in regard to comparative 
case study research was published by Bartlett and Vavrus. They portrayed the methodology as an 
innovative approach that attends simultaneously to macro, meso, and micro dimensions of case-
based research. The comparative case study research promotes multi-sided fieldwork studies 
through and across sides and scales. They proposed that comparative case study research should 
attend to three axes: horizontal, vertical, and transversal comparison. The horizontal look should 
not only contrast cases with each other but also trace social actors, documents, and other 
influences across those cases. The vertical comparison examines influences at different 
hierarchical levels, from the international to the national to the regional and the local scales. The 
transversal is necessary for a comparison over time. In theory, the horizontal and vertical 
perspectives should be considered historically but often they are not. Therefore, the third 
transversal axis is needed (Bartlett & Vavrus, 2017).  
Comparative case study research examples. Comparative case study research is 
conducted for a variety of disciplines. The following pages will describe selected cases studies 
the author of this thesis found relevant and applicable to the project. 
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Storage tank incidents. Chang and Lin compared 242 accidents involving storage tanks 
that contained hazardous chemicals in industrial facilities that happened over the last 40 years. 
The paper aimed to analyze the causes of those occurrences. The information about the 242 
accidents was collected from public reports. They used the fishbone diagram (cause and effect 
diagram) that was invented by Dr. Kaoru Ishikawa for the identification of effects and causes 
that created the storage tank accidents (Ishikawa, 1985).  The most accidents occurred for 
petroleum refineries (116), 64 cases happened at terminals and pumping stations, 31 cases at 
chemical plants, six cases on oil fields, and 25 cases at other industrial facilities such as power 
plants, gas, pipeline, fertilizer, and plating plants. The most frequent cause of loss was fire for 
145 cases, explosions occurred for 61 cases. Oil spills ranked third (18 cases) and toxic gas 
releases fourth (13 cases). The distortion of tank bodies and worker’s falling only occurred a few 
times. Lightning was the most frequent cause of incidents (80 cases), maintenance errors ranked 
second (32 cases). There were 29 cases of operational errors, 19 equipment failures, 18 acts of 
sabotage, 17 cracks/ruptures, 15 leaks and line ruptures, 12 cases caused by static electricity, 
eight open flame incidents, seven natural disasters, and five runaway reactions. Figure 8 shows 
the fishbone diagram for storage tank incident causes. Figure 9 displays the fishbone diagram of 





Figure 8. Storage tank incident causes (Chang & Lin, 2006). 
 
Figure 9. Preventive measures for storage tank incidents (Chang & Lin, 2006). 
 The researchers concluded that most of the storage tank accidents that had occurred could 
have been avoided if good engineering in design, construction, maintenance, and operations had 
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been practiced and safety management programs had been implemented an executed (Chang & 
Lin, 2006). 
MSDSs comparison and evaluation. In 2012, Eastlake et al. published about their 
comparison and evaluation of MSDSs for different nanomaterials. A sample of 59 MSDSs was 
collected from 2007 to 2008 from 32 different manufacturers. In 2010 to 2011, 21 additional 
MSDSs were obtained. Additionally, 23 MSDSs from the first set of 2007 to 2008 were 
recollected for comparison in order to determine if improvements and revisions had occurred. 
The MSDSs were evaluated based on questions intended to determine if the content was 
informative and safety-relevant. It was of special interest if hazard identification, exposure 
controls, appropriate PPE, and toxicological information were included. A statistical analysis 
was performed. For the 2007 to 2008 set, 21.8 percent were satisfactory, 40.6 percent needed 
improvement, and 37.5 percent needed significant improvement. The most common deficit was 
the lack of toxicological data specific to the nanomaterial and the particle size range was not 
included. For 59.4 percent of the MSDSs occupational exposure limits (OEL) for the bulk 
material were listed but no OEL for the nanomaterial was mentioned. The recollected MSDSs 
were compared to the originals which showed that an overall decrease in the percent of MSDSs 
ranked satisfactory or in need of improvement and an increase in the number of MSDSs ranked 
in need of significant improvement. For the set of 2010 to 2011, the most common deficiency 
was a failure to specify that the material is in the nanometer size range. As a conclusion, this 
study revealed that important information was not being developed or included on MSDSs for 
nanomaterials. They recommended extensive literature reviews on the specific nanomaterials. 




Research Exploring the Chemical Safety Culture for Academia and Educational Facilities 
Recent publications focus on the topic of chemical safety climate and safety culture at 
academic institutions. Among those articles are evaluations of conducted surveys, 
recommendations for establishing safety programs at academic institutions, effective teaching 
methods for safe practices in the chemical laboratory, and concepts how to provide chemists with 
the necessary knowledge, skills, and experiences during their undergraduate studies. 
Epidemiology of accidents in academic laboratories. Hellmann, Savage, and Keefe 
conducted an accident intervention study based on the results of a statewide chemistry accident 
survey that was conducted in Colorado, and additional observations that were made about 
academic chemical laboratory accidents as a whole. Two institutions were selected from the 
institutions that participated in the statewide survey. The data of their accident rates were 
adjusted for accidents per 9,000 student hours for each semester from spring 1974 to the fall of 
1983. During the intervention semester the chemistry professors of Institution A who were 
teaching general, organic, and quantitative analysis received a summary for the statewide survey 
database to supplement their safety instruction for the fall semester of 1984. Additionally, a new 
accident report form was provided. This new form was considered important for establishing 
legal responsibilities. During the intervention semester, the accident rate for institution A 
increased from 0.24 accidents per 9,000 students to 0.47 accidents per 9,000 students. For the 
control institution, Institution B, the accident rate decreased from 1.13 accidents per 9,000 
students to 0.36 accidents per 9,000 students. The researchers concluded that the increased 
accident rate for Institution A could be due to a change of behavior because the students knew 
that they were being observed. Additional explanations were underreporting that had taken place 
at Institution A for the previous three semesters and that classroom lectures about safety that 
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were given to at-risk student populations were not the most effective way of accident prevention 
and control. The detailed analysis of the data indicated that three environmental factors can 
contribute to the risk of generating accidents in an academic chemistry laboratory: the design of 
equipment and facility, the activity or function required for the laboratory exercise, and the 
available PPE. Each of those components can be altered or improved so that a decrease of the 
frequency for laboratory accidents can be archived. The practicality of their potential to reduce 
accidents depends on the purchase and maintenance costs, the degree of reliance on human 
behavior, and the ease of adaptability to new circumstances. The researchers concluded that the 
most effective way of reducing incidents at academic institutions is the improvement of design 
and building features so that the risk and safety management system does not have to rely 
heavily on appropriate student conduct in the laboratory facilities (Hellman, Savage & Keefe, 
1986). 
Safety climate at public universities. In 2016, researchers published a study for which 
the evaluated the safety climate at a Louisiana State University by utilizing data from a 
previously conducted survey. The institution had suffered from a natural disaster in 2008 when 
hurricane Gustav made landfall. A survey of laboratory personnel was conducted in 2011. This 
was done by graduate students who did a project for their environmental science course. 
Approximately 150 people were asked to participate and about 85 responded. The initial survey 
data, which was intended to estimate the impact of a hurricane on research facilities and to 
prepare for future events, was culled to 26 questions related to laboratory safety concerns. The 
goal was to estimate the safety climate levels in the laboratories and to assign a numerical value. 
The questions were divided into three groups that corresponded to already existing safety climate 
studies performed at other academic institutions. The safety perception was determined by the 
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answers to the questions that concerned potential hazards, hazardous events, emergency 
response, security, and feeling unsafe.  The commitment of direct supervision to safety was 
determined by questions about PPE use, enforcement of PPE use, training, audits, use of standard 
operation procedures (SOPs), access to MSDSs, and housekeeping. The upper management’s 
commitment to safety was evaluated by asking about safety equipment, practices that support 
safety, such as chemical inventory, fire drills, and fire extinguisher inspections. Figure 10 shows 
the percentage of laboratory personnel by length of service and position. Table 1 displays 
questions related to the upper management commitment to safety and the corresponding results. 
Table 2 illustrates questions related to the direct supervision commitment to safety and the 
corresponding results. Table 3 shows questions related to workers’ safety perception (Steward, 
Wilson & Wang, 2016). 
 
Figure 10. Percentage of laboratory personnel by length of service and position (Steward, 




Table 1. Upper management commitment (Steward, Wilson & Wang, 2016). 
 








Table 3. Worker’s safety perception (Steward, Wilson & Wang, 2016). 
 
An ANOVA was completed for each question in order to determine if there was a 
significant difference between rank and time of service on each question. The questions were 
grouped according to the categories PHY (physical safety equipment), DEPT (department; 
represents the safety commitment of direct supervision), and PERC (perception of safety).  The 
ANOVA results were only significant for “length of service” and “number of accidents”. 
Participants with over six years of experience had a significant increase in hazardous events. 
Additionally, a factor analysis was performed. Only questions with Eigenvalues greater than one 
were significant for the estimation of the safety climate at the university. Assuming an equal 
weight for those questions, the values for the perceived safety climate were 3.72 ± 1.71 (on a 
scale from 1, “low”, to 5, “high”). The survey showed that the perceived safety climate was in 
the same range as for previously conducted surveys for five other universities. The significant 
numerical factors used in the determination of the managerial level of safety commitment (PHY) 
at the University were related to providing physical safety items for the laboratory like fire 
suppression, laboratory hoods, and safety showers. Nearly all of the participants responded that 
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PPE is required in their laboratory work areas, but enforcement and training for use of PPE did 
not seem satisfactory. The survey showed that inspections were conducted, but the types of 
inspections were not specified. In general, laboratory personnel felt that housekeeping in the 
laboratory is a problem. As many employees indicated that they knew about the existence of 
SOP’s in the laboratory, but the survey did not address details about the format of those and if 
the employees knew where to find them. About half of the participants indicated that they did not 
receive a form of mandatory safety training before they started working in the laboratory. The 
researchers concluded that assigning numerical values to different parameters for a safety climate 
was a difficult task and those metrics were hard to define and difficult to collect. The question of 
the relative merit of a safety culture at universities was left open for debate. Behavioral and 
situational aspects have not been fully considered for the academic environment. Methods to 
address safety concerns need to be developed and validated (Steward, Wilson & Wang, 2016).  
Construction of bowtie diagram for the Texas Tech laboratory incident. In 2016, the 
Division of Chemical Health and Safety (DCHAS) conducted an interactive symposium at an 
American Chemical Society Conference. The group exercise for the participants of the 
symposium was to create a bowtie diagram for an incident that involved hazardous chemicals. 
The facilitators used the example of the 2011 CSB case study of a laboratory incident that 
occurred at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas (Mulcahy, Boylan, Sigmann & Stuart, 
2017). At the chemistry department, a graduate student was severely injured while handling a 
highly energetic metal compound that suddenly detonated (Chemical Safety Board, 2010). The 
people at the symposium were asked to identify the hazard, the top event, the threats and 
consequences, as well as preventive and mitigative safety barriers. The group quickly identified 
the energetic material has the “hazard”, and the exceeding of the safety critical limit as the “top 
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event”. However, they made the typical initial mistake of listing failing barriers (no written 
SOPs; no PPE: untrained workers; lack of communication; and no supervision) as threads. The 
actual threads were intentional and inadvertent synthesis scale-up and the criminal activities of 
the graduate students. The consequences were defined as injury/fatality, reputation damage, and 
loss of funding. The final result of the symposium is depicted in Figure 11. Some examples of 
preventive barriers were restricted access to the laboratory, pre-approval of procedures, and strict 
synthesis limits for new materials. Mitigative barriers were PPE, activate alarm and emergency 
response, communications with the primary investigator, and others (Mulcahy et al., 2017). 
 
Figure 11. Completed bowtie for Texas Tech laboratory incident (Mulcahy et al., 2017). 
The danger of chemistry demonstrations. Sigmann recently published an article that 
explained some of the serious issues of chemistry demonstrations. Over the past 20 years, almost 
200 children and educators were injured because they participated in chemical demonstrations 
that involved the use of fire and flammable solvents. The “rainbow demonstration” has proven 
itself as especially problematic. For the demonstration, a row of dishes, each containing a 
different salt and methanol is used. Methanol is filled into the dishes and the mixtures are 
ignited. The goal is to produce a color scheme that has the colors of a rainbow. In order to 
characterize and assess the hazards associated with the experiment, Sigmann constructed a 
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bowtie diagram (Figure 12) for the setting of flammable solvent demonstrations (Sigmann, 
2018b).  
 
Figure 12. Bowtie diagram for flammable solvent demonstration (Sigmann, 2018b). 
The hazard present because of the flammable solvent. The critical event is a flash fire 
leading to a flame jet. Threads that can lead to the critical event are inadequate ventilation, 
excess solvent, and not conducting a timely safety discussion. The consequences of the critical 
event could be injury, property damage, and creating a fear of science. Preventive barriers can be 
engineering controls, such as adequate ventilation and chemical fume hoods, and administrative 
controls such as training and procedures. Examples for mitigative barriers are an active alarm 
system and fire extinguishers.  
 It is Sigmann’s conclusion that the safety problems with chemical demonstrations are 
continuing because to “blow stuff up” is a great fascination for many, especially children. 
Educators are competing against filmmakers and bloggers. The demonstrations have to be most 
spectacular. Many written procedures have been published, yet they often lack complete risk 
33 
 
assessment of the hazards for the demonstrations. Propagation to educators about negative 
consequences might help to prevent some of the incidents in the future. Advocating for change 
and holding educators accountable to a standard duty of care is necessary to accomplish change. 
Additionally, K-12 teachers need to be educated about the safe handling of chemicals. A variety 
of electronic resources is available, and this information should be utilized before demonstrations 




Purpose of Study 
This study intended to compare published case studies of laboratory incidents that 
involved hazardous chemicals and occurred in the United States. The project was intended to 
provide insight on the laboratory work settings of educational and academic institutions. In order 
to understand the dynamics of those work systems, it was important to dissect all the available 
information about the hazardous incidents and to put it in context to the general work setting.  
In order to do an objective comparison, the publications that described the hazardous incidents 
needed to provide detailed information about the settings of the cases. It was the goal to identify 
different components of the hazardous incidents and then construct bowtie diagrams with the 
obtained information, using computer software (BowTieXP, 2019). The bowtie methodology 
helps not only to evaluate the effectiveness of the preventive and mitigative barriers that were 
put in place but also to make recommendations about what important risk management 
components were missing. The identification and evaluation of common flaws for the selected 
cases can potentially help with the improvement of risk management frameworks of other 
locations as well. The communication and education of chemical health and safety is an 
important component for the occupational health and safety program at primary educational 
facilities and academic institutions. One limitation of this study was that the evaluation of the 
different laboratory incidents was based on information that was included to the publications and 
incident investigations. This project had to rely on the accuracy and completeness of the 
provided details. The author was the only person analyzing the case studies and constructing the 
bowtie diagrams. In order to eliminate potential bias, it was a goal to exclude personal opinions 
and only to utilize the published information.   
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Selection of Case Studies 
For most cases that were included to the list published by the U.S. Chemical Safety 
Board, just basic information about location, date, and time of the incidents, involved persons, 
and results had been published. Detailed information was not made available to the public. Only 
two cases from the list which occurred at academic or educational institutions had in fact been 
investigated by the U. S.  Chemical Safety Board. For this thesis, those two hazardous events 
together with nine additional case studies about laboratory incidents were analyzed. All of them 
occurred at different academic and educational institutions located in the United States and were 
either published in peer-reviewed academic journals or incident investigations. The 
recommendations for conducting a comparative case study research project that were published 
by the UNICEF Research Office were followed (Goodrick, 2014): 
Selection of the Key Evaluation Questions. Since the project aimed to find common 
denominators between the different cases and flaws for the associated risk management systems 
it was very important to define the different components of those systems. The protagonists, the 
hazard which led to the critical event, the threats, the consequences, the preventive and 
mitigative safety barriers including their functionality were outlined. Furthermore, it was also of 
interest if there is any information about safety improvements that were made after the critical 
events occurred. 
Initial theories. The initial theories can be derived from evidence presented in the news 
are that academic and educational institutions often do not have functioning chemical health and 
safety management and control systems. Hazardous incidents occur with a high frequency. 
Personnel and students do not receive adequate training or do not have sufficient knowledge 
before the start of conducting potentially dangerous experiments that involve the use of 
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hazardous chemicals. Regulations and laws need to be adjusted so that universities, colleges, and 
primary academic institutions are held to a higher standard of accountability.   
Criteria for the selection of the case studies. The criteria for selection were (1) case 
studies were published in peer-reviewed academic journals or published investigations by the 
Chemical Safety Board; (2) incident occurred in a primary educational institution or academic 
institution; and (3) the case study included detailed descriptions of the setting, measures of risk 
management, and consequences of the incident. Table 4 gives an overview of the case studies the 
author was able to collect. 
Table 4. Overview of the selected case studies. 
Case Title Institution Type Author or Source, Year 
1 CXXV. An Accident with Acetic Acid and Bromine University Burnett, 1975 
2 
Hazards in a Photography Lab - A Cyanide Incident 
Case Study 
University Houk & Hart, 1987 
3 
Injury and Fire Resulting from Benzene Vapor 
Explosion in a Chemistry Laboratory 
University 
University of California, 
Irvine Independent Accident 
Investigation, 2002 
4 
Mercury Spill Decontamination Incident at the 
Rockefeller University 
University Santoro, 2006 
5 Texas Tech University - Laboratory Explosion University 
Chemical Safety Board, 
2010 
6 
Laboratory emergency response: A case study of the 
response to a 32P contamination incident 
University Ashbrook, 2011 
7 
Case study -Incident investigation: Laboratory 
explosion 
University Phifer, 2014 
8 
Key Lessons for Preventing Incidents from 
Flammable Chemicals in Educational Demonstrations 
Educational 
Museum 
Chemical Safety Board, 
2014 
9 
Report to the University of Hawaii at Manoa on the 
Hydrogen/Oxygen Explosion of March 16, 2016 
University 
Merlic, Ngai, Schroeder & 
Smith, 2016 
10 
Case study - A two-liter pyridine spill in an 
undergraduate laboratory 
University Eichler, 2016 
11 
Case study: Reaction scale-up leads to incident 
involving bromine and acetone 
University Chance, 2016 
 
Evidence collection. The author used the publications to identify the parameters that 
answer the Key Evaluation Questions. With those results, bowtie diagrams for each case study 
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are going to be constructed. This visual method will hopefully help with find common 
denominators for each case. The results are going to be synthesized and discussed. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
In the results chapter, the different case studies are summarized. The protagonists, the 
hazard, the critical event, the threats, the consequences, as well as the preventive and mitigative 
safety barrier, are identified and illustrated as components of bowtie diagrams. Information about 
safety improvements for the institutions where the incidents occurred is included in the case 
summary when it was part of the publication. Bowtie diagrams are constructed using the 
software BowTieXP (BowTieXP, 2019) and have been embedded between each case description 
and discussion. The discussion of the findings that resulted from the evaluation of the different 
laboratory incidents includes answers for the key evaluation questions that were defined in the 
methodology chapter. The special interest is focused on similarities and differences for the cases. 
Two of the cases, Case 5:” Texas Tech University – Laboratory Explosion” and Case 8:” Key 
Lessons for Preventing Incidents from Flammable Chemicals in Educational Demonstrations”, 
incident assessments were previously performed and published (Mulcahy et al., 2017, and 
Sigmann, 2018b). The results of this comparative case study are therefore compared to the 
previously published results. This illustrates the advantage of the comparative case study 
research objective; it is possible to repeatedly test evidence without repeating the incident or 
experiment (Goodrick, 2014). 
Case 1: CXXV. An Accident with Acetic Acid and Bromine 
A graduate student assistant received the task of preparing two liters of a solution that 
contained 0.05 M bromine and 90 percent acetic acid (glacial acetic acid). The author of the 
publication assumes that the student was not able to find glacial acetic acid and therefore 
attempted to make it from acetic acid anhydride. He attempted to prepare two solutions. No other 
students were present in the laboratory at the time. For Solution A, he added 900 mL acetic acid 
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anhydride to 100 mL of water and then added 0.8 grams of bromine. He worked inside a fume 
hood. The bottle was gently shaken and transported from Laboratory 1 to Laboratory 2 which 
took about 5 to 10 minutes.  Then he prepared Solution B the same way as solution A, except 
this bottle was vigorously bubbling and left in the fume hood of Laboratory 1.  The student left 
Laboratory 1 for another task and as he came back, he found Solution B bubbling violently. He 
placed himself off-center and attempted to remove the plastic cap from the bottle of Solution B.  
This was when it exploded. The student received two deep cuts on one arm. He left the room and 
was seeking help at the nearby chemical stockroom and research laboratories. While first-aid was 
administered, Solution A exploded in Laboratory 2. The second explosion took place within 
minutes of the first. The author describes that, after the incident, the safety policies and 
regulations of the department were updated. He also suggests that graduate students should 
receive safety training as part of their orientation (Burnett, 1975).  
 
Figure 13. Bowtie of acetic acid anhydride/ bromine incident. 
Discussion. The bowtie diagram shows that the institution had several failing preventive 
barriers. The graduate student assistant should have received adequate safety training before he 
started to work in the laboratory. This usually includes reading the safety data sheets of the 
chemicals that are used for the preparation of mixtures. He should not have had unrestricted 
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access to the chemical stockroom and the chemical inventory. Also, while he had found the 
solution vigorously bubbling, he should not have tried to remove the cap from the flask.  He 
should have had a written SOP procedure available that specifically described how to make the 
bromine/acetic acid mixture. This university seemed to have a lack of supervision. Also, 
graduate students did not receive safety training as part of their orientation.  
Case 2: Hazards in a Photography Lab - A Cyanide Incident Case Study 
The author mentions two incidents that involved that resulted in the release of hydrogen 
cyanide at a photo laboratory. Just the second incident is described in detail. Therefore, it is the 
only one used for this comparative case study research project: As part of their lecture, a faculty 
member demonstrated a cyanotype process technique to several students at a darkroom. For 
developing the pictures, he used a 50/50 mixture of potassium ferricyanide (cyano A) and ferric 
ammonium citrate (cyano B). Both mixtures contained 5-10 percent of the active ingredient. The 
faculty member was aware that hydrogen cyanide could be released because a similar incident 
had occurred at a previous workplace. Four photos were coated using the mixture. The sink was 
flushed with large volumes of water. The faculty stated that the workplace was found clean and 
dry before he started processing the pictures. After the first photo was processed, dried, and 
exposed to UV light outside of the darkroom, the group went back inside and found the 
remaining pictures still dripping and wet from the applied mixture. The faculty member noticed 
the characteristic almond smell of hydrogen cyanide and the students simultaneously started 
complaining about headaches. The group evacuated the area and notified housekeeping, 
environmental health and safety personnel, as well as the local fire department. The building was 
evacuated completely and fire personnel, equipped with self-containing breath apparatuses 
sealed the exits. The building was occupied the following morning.  An investigation failed to 
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establish an exact cause for the incident. Bad housekeeping was suspected. An acid of some sort 
most have been on the countertops below the wet pictures. The mixture was dripping on the 
surface and as a result, hydrogen cyanide was released. It was also determined that the 
ventilation of the darkroom was turned off during the incident. The faculty member did not even 
know that a ventilation system was installed in the room. The reason behind it was because the 
ventilation system was not properly functioning and made loud noises when it was turned on. At 
the end of the publication, the author included a list of safety precautions for the handling of 
cyanide-containing materials and advises faculty members and photo lab managers to strictly 
enforces the safety regulations (Houk & Hart, 1987). 
 
Figure 14. Bowtie of cyanide incident. 
Discussion. The university did not have any written procedures for how to conduct 
housekeeping in the darkroom. The ventilation of the darkroom was not properly functioning and 
turned off because it made loud noises. The faculty member did not even know that the 
ventilation system existed. On the other hand, he was aware of the possibility that hydrogen 
cyanide could be released during the developing procedure of the pictures. Still, he did not apply 
his knowledge and brought it to the attention of the department so that the work process could be 
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changed. It was not possible to determine the cause of the incident. Only after housekeeping, 
environmental health and safety personnel, and the local fire department were already notified, 
the building was evacuated completely. This case shows that the institution did not only have 
server communication issues, but also no functioning risk management program that could have 
assessed the situation in the teaching facilities and aimed to improve the situation.  
Case 3: Injury and Fire Resulting from Benzene Vapor Explosion in a Chemistry 
Laboratory 
The publication describes an accident that occurred on July 23, 2001, at the University of 
California, Irvine, located in Irvine, CA. The accident occurred in a chemistry laboratory and 
resulted in an injury to a graduate student and a fire that caused approximately $3.5 million in 
damage. The student was also a University employee working for a principal investigator’s 
funded project. He received serious burns from a benzene vapor explosion that occurred inside of 
a laboratory fume hood. The student was purifying benzene using a reflux/distillation apparatus. 
Eventually, the system became over-pressurized and the student tried to physically hold the 
distillation head on the flask. The over-pressured system disassembled at the sintered glass fitting 
between the two glass components.  A fine mist of benzene was released into the fume hood. 
This was where an unknown source ignited the benzene vapor which resulting in an explosion 
and subsequent fire. The direct cause of the over-pressurization was not determined. However, it 
was assessed that the lack of a clear path from the distillation flask through the pressure-relief 
portion of the apparatus resulted in the system disassembling and releasing the benzene mist of 
benzene.  The student, who was standing in front of the fume hood, was burned by the fire and 
explosion. He received first- and second-degree burns on the face, neck, right arm, and right leg 
received first- and second-degree burns. The student was wearing safety glasses when the 
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incident occurred. He evacuated the room and was taken by private automobile to the UCI 
Medical Center, where he was hospitalized for four days. The student did not suffer from any 
long-term health effects caused by the accident, and he graduated on time with a Ph.D. in 
chemistry. His professor and fellow students, who were present while the incident occurred, 
evacuated the laboratories on the second floor. The resulting fire activated a smoke detector tied 
into the building fire alarm system. After a couple of minutes, two manual fire alarm stations 
were also pulled.  Emergency response to the scene was immediate and the resulting fire was 
extinguished within two hours. Except for the laboratory where the incident had occurred and the 
adjacent instrument room, the entire building was reoccupied within five days (University of 
California, Irvine Independent Accident Investigation, 2002).   
 
Figure 15. Bowtie of benzene vapor explosion incident. 
Discussion. UC Irvine had several functioning controls and barriers in place. The student 
was working inside of a fume hood and the student was wearing safety glasses during the time 
the explosion occurred. A smoke detector was activated by the fire and two fire alarm stations 
were pulled. This initiated a timely emergency response so that the building was reoccupied 
within five days. The failing preventive barrier in this case was training. If the student had had 
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adequate training, he would not have attempted to physically hold the distillation head of the 
apparatus in place. After the incident occurred, he was taken to the hospital by a private 
automobile. There was no information included in the publication whether it was against 
protocol to use a private vehicle for the transport of injured individuals. 
Case 4: Mercury Spill Decontamination Incident at the Rockefeller University 
A mercury contamination incident that occurred in August of 2003 at the Rockefeller 
University in New York City, New York. Approximately two grams of mercury supposedly 
evaporated completely. The substance can be absorbed into the human body by inhalation of its 
vapor and through the skin. Acute inhalation exposure to mercury vapor can result in chest pains, 
dyspnea, coughing, hemoptysis, and occasionally interstitial pneumonitis leading to death. The 
central nervous system is the target organ for mercury vapor exposure (PubChem, 2019). The 
amount originated from a mercury thermometer that was left unattended in a hot water bath. The 
incident occurred in a cold room with an average temperature of 1 °C. The room contained many 
biological samples that belonged to different research groups, as well as expensive laboratory 
equipment, stock chemicals, radioactive materials, radioactive and biological waste. The 
extensive decontamination of the room was finished after three weeks. Several thousand dollars 
were spent on the salaries of clean up personnel, analytical sampling of the room, and the waste 
disposal of the debris that contained mercury. Many laboratory samples and materials were lost. 
The author encourages researchers to take advantage of the mercury thermometer exchange 
program that is offered by the Rockefeller University. Thermometers that contain alcohol or 




Figure 16. Bowtie of mercury spill incident. 
Discussion. A mercury thermometer was used to measure the temperature of a hot water 
bath that was left unattended. The author stated that many samples were lost, and the 
decontamination & clean-up was very costly. It would have been easy to replace the mercury 
thermometer with an alcohol thermometer or a digital model. It is also very problematic that a 
large number of samples and reagents were stored in the work area. It is best practice to keep 
chemicals and reagents in a designated stockroom and samples that need to be stored long-term 
in a designated storage area. Just samples that are currently processed and reagents that are 
currently in use should be in the working areas of the laboratory. Furthermore, it is unclear why a 
hot water bath was left unattended in a room that had the temperature set to 1°C. This case shows 
that Rockefeller University did not only have deficits for planning and conducting their 
laboratory procedures but also for the design and organization of work areas and storage spaces. 
Case 5: Texas Tech University – Laboratory Explosion 
The U.S. Chemical Safety Board thoroughly investigated a laboratory explosion that 
occurred at Texas Tech University in Lubbock, Texas (Chemical Safety Board, 2010). This case 
previously served as an example to construct a bow-tie diagram at an ACS conference (Mulcahy 
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et al., 2017).  The situation was described as follows: About a month before the incident, a fifth-
year graduate student together with the first-year graduate began with the synthesis of a nickel 
hydrazine perchlorate (NHP) derivative. The synthesized amounts of the compound were 
between 50-300 milligrams. The students ran several analytical tests in order to determine the 
quality and purity of their product. They determined that they would need several batches of the 
compound to complete all necessary analyses. Therefore, they decided to scale-up the synthesis 
of NHP and make about 10 grams of the product.  The principal investigators were not consulted 
on the decision to scale up the synthesis. No written policies about any laboratory procedures 
existed at the time. The two students had previously discovered that smaller amounts of the 
compound would not ignite or explode on impact when wet with water or solvent. They 
concluded that the hazards of greater amounts of NHP could be controlled similarly. 
After the scale-up, the more senior student noticed clumps in the synthesis product. 
He transferred about half of the synthesized NHP into a mortar, added hexane, and then used a 
pestle to break up the clumps. It had not been evaluated if the use of either water or hexane was 
suitable for the mitigation of the potential explosive hazards associated with the quantity of the 
synthesized product. First, the more senior graduate student was wearing goggles, but he 
removed them as he walked away from the mortar after he finished breaking the clumps.  
As he returned to the mortar, he did not replace his goggles while he stirred the product once 
more. This was when the compound detonated.  After the incident, all the universities who were 
partners in the ALERT program executed a voluntary stop-work order in the laboratories for 
working with energetic materials. This was maintained until safety changes were implemented 
and independent reviewers could audit the laboratories’ written safety procedures and standard 




Figure 17. Bowtie of Texas Tech laboratory incident. 
Discussion. The two graduate students that were involved in the incident decided to 
scale-up the synthesis without consulting their principal investigator first. Another publication 
already described this as criminal behavior (Mulcahy et al., 2017). The information that was 
described in the report of the U.S. Chemical Safety Boards did not provide enough detail to 
evaluate the intentions of the students. However, it can be assumed that they did not have 
sufficient knowledge about the hazards of the mixture. Together with their principal investigator 
and the chemical hygiene officer of the department, they should have conducted a risk 
assessment before they made any changes to the protocol of the synthesis. The more senior 
graduate student also made the mistake of removing his eye protection while he was conducting 
the experiment. In any laboratory where hazardous chemicals are present, proper eye protection 
should be required at all times. It is important to communicate to students, that they should make 
it a habit to wear proper eye protection, even when it seems inconvenient.  It was a very good 
practice that the university communicated the occurrence of the hazardous incident to other 
universities and a voluntary stop for procedures that involved energetic materials was executed 
until the investigation of the incident was concluded. This potentially prevented similar incidents 
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at other academic institutions. The information about the hazardous incident needs to include 
detailed information about the setting, the involved people, how the incident progressed, and the 
results. 
Case 6: Laboratory emergency response: A case study of the response to a 32P 
contamination incident 
A contamination incident with radioactive material occurred on a Monday afternoon at 
the University of Missouri in Columbia, Missouri. EHS personnel was contacted by a radiation 
worker who informed them that he had accidentally contaminated the soles of his shoes with 
radioactive phosphorous isotope 32P and was asking for advice. The health physicist who 
answered the call determined that there were enough uncertainties with the information that a 
response was necessary. When he reached the laboratory, the health physicist confirmed some 
contamination in the laboratory. He further questioned the laboratory worker and became 
suspicious that contamination may have been spread beyond what was first stated. A second 
health physician and the other two safety professionals realized that they would need additional 
assistance. They contacted the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), who was off campus on that day 
and not able to personally respond. Therefore, he informed the EHS director. The EHS director 
dispatched an assistant director and called additional staff members to the site. Most of them 
worked through the night and tried to determine the extent of the contamination and tried to keep 
it from spreading further. Access to the contaminated areas was restricted, custodial and 
maintenance services were suspended. By Tuesday morning, contamination was found in the 
building where the source laboratory was located, in two additional buildings, and in multiple 
locations on outside sidewalks. The clean-up continued and by Thursday, the Principal 
Investigator reviewed his inventory and stated that the spill could only consist of 10 microcuries 
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of 32P or less. The emergency response activities continued throughout the week. As a result, the 
number of restricted areas, as well as the size of the contaminated areas decreased each day until 
only the source laboratory was an area of concern. When the operation was completed, EHS had 
spent 500 man-hours for the response. The cleanup costs, excluding man-hours, were assessed at 
$40,000. The main costs resulted from the removal and replacement of flooring materials 
(Ashbrook, 2011). 
 
Figure 18. Bowtie of radioactive material contamination incident. 
Discussion. This incident showed that the University of Missouri in Columbia, Missouri, 
had inadequate workplace regulations for the laboratories where the radioactive material was 
processed. The first issue of this case is that had the radiation worker, who was working alone at 
the laboratory, not voluntarily reported the contamination incident, the contamination could have 
spread even further. After the worker was questioned by the health physicist, it was determined 
that the technician had already left the laboratory room and that the environment had already 
been contaminated. This was one cause for a delayed and prolonged emergency response. The 
EHS personnel should have immediately cleared the area instead of spending too much time with 
questioning the technician. The immediate use of a radiation detector would have provided more 
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reliable results than the statement of the technician. Since the investigation took relatively long, 
other workers could have potentially been in contact with the radioactive material while it was 
still ongoing. It was also very unfortunate that the Radiation Safety Officer was off-campus on 
that day. This slowed down the incident communications and the emergency response.  
Case 7: Case study –Incident investigation: Laboratory explosion 
A postdoctoral research associate performed a synthesis of hydroxymethylfurfural 
(HMF) in a thick-walled glass tube that was closed with a Teflon stopper. The objective of the 
experiment was the conversion of sucrose into hydroxymethylfurfural using silica-sulfuric acid 
as a catalyst. The synthesis used 500 mg of sucrose, 250 mg of catalyst, 3 mL of sodium chloride 
solution, and 9 ml of dimethylsulfoxide. The compounds were heated in a thick-walled glass tube 
with a Teflon screw top. The temperature was 150 °C for 6 h with constant stirring using a 
magnetic stir bar (200 rpm). A silicone oil bath that was placed on top of a Corning PC 420D hot 
plate was used for heating the glass tube and its contents. The hot plate was new and had 
reportedly not been used before. The synthesis was performed in a chemical hood. A similar 
experiment was placed about 30 cm to the right of the subject synthesis. It used a different 
hotplate model and a different carbohydrate (cellulose) but was otherwise identical. Fourteen 
waste containers some of which contained small quantities of flammable organic compounds 
were placed along the rear wall of the chemical hood. The hood had a posted face velocity 
of 102 cfm and was recently tested. An explosion took place after 4 hours in the procedure. This 
resulted in a small fire that involved the hotplate power wire and the silicone oil bath. The post-
docs desk was located around the corner, so he was not able to observe the experiment. After the 
incident, he stated that he frequently checked on the experimental apparatus and the temperature 
had remained stable at 150 °C. It was later found that the same model of hotplate had overheated 
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at a different university while the heat control was in the off position. Later, the post-doctoral 
assistant, as well as the principal investigator, stated that they believe that the incident was 
caused by the malfunctioning hotplate. It was also noted that the EHS department of the 
university was not involved in chemical safety training for the department (Phifer, 2014). 
 
Figure 19. Bowtie of synthesis laboratory explosion incident. 
Discussion. Several factors contributed to the laboratory fire and explosion of this case 
study. The postdoctoral researcher did not observe the synthesis constantly. The personnel either 
did not receive adequate chemical hygiene training or did not follow best practices because 
several waste containers were stored in the fume hood, a location where the synthesis apparatus 
was set up. The hot plate that was used to heat the oil bath was new, but not tested before it was 
used in the laboratory. It is best practice to test electronic equipment frequently, otherwise it can 
become a fire hazard. It was later found that a hotplate that was the same model malfunctioned at 
a different university. For the future, it would be very useful if university facilities that do similar 
work, for example, chemical laboratory facilities, have a reporting system that provides 
information about hazardous incidents to other locations. 
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Case 8: Key Lessons for Preventing Incidents from Flammable Chemicals in Educational 
Demonstrations 
On September 3, 2014, at around 4:00 pm, an educator was performing three variations 
of the Fire Tornado demonstration for a group of young children at the Terry Lee Wells Nevada 
Discovery Museum in Reno, Nevada. The basic procedure for all three variations was the same, 
only the fuel source and color additive were changed: A cotton ball is placed on a glass dish and 
the fuel, isopropanol or methanol, is added to the dish in order to saturate the cotton ball. Then 
the color additive, strontium nitrate or boric acid, is added or sprinkled onto the cotton ball. The 
educator then places the dish on a turntable and the cotton ball is ignited using a barbeque-type 
butane lighter. The set-up is covered using a wire mesh wastebasket. The educator then spins the 
turntable which creates the tornado effect. After each fire tornado procedure, the wire mesh 
basket is removed. The visitors sat on the floor approximately 15 feet away from the 
demonstration. The first two variations of the demonstration were performed without an incident. 
During the third variation, the educator held the lighter flame to the cotton ball, but the expected 
fuel flame did not rise. The educator noticed that methanol fuel had not been added to the cotton 
ball. The educator attempted to pour a small volume of methanol onto the cotton ball. She poured 
the amount from a four-liter methanol plastic container. Although there had been no sign of 
flames from the cotton ball, it is likely that the lighter had ignited the cotton, and it was 
smoldering. The poured methanol ignited instantly and then flashed back into the four-liter 
methanol container. This was when the methanol inside the container ignited, resulting in a 
pressure increase that caused the rise of a large flame from the mouth of the container, which 
then resulted in a large flash fire. The educator dropped the methanol container after it caught 
fire and burning methanol spread toward the visitors, some of them caught fire. In response to 
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the fire, two of the museum employees were able to extinguish the fire using a nearby fire 
extinguisher and a fire blanket. Because of the incident, thirteen people were injured, including 
eight children and one adult. They were transported to the hospital and one child was kept 
overnight for medical treatment and additional observation (Chemical Safety Board, 2014). 
 
Figure 20. Bowtie of educational demonstration incident. 
Discussion. Failing mitigative barriers were the main causes of the incident at the 
Discovery Museum in Reno, Nevada. There was no physical barrier between the educator who 
performed the demonstration and the audience. The educator did not have sufficient training, 
otherwise, they would not have poured the methanol directly from the four-liter storage 
container. Safety-cans are a convenient and safe way to store and pour flammable solvents. The 
educator deviated from the regular procedure because they attempted to soak the cotton ball that 
was left dry in the midst of the procedure. While it was very fortunate that two other employees 
of the museum were able to extinguish the fire, it is unclear why the educator who had performed 
the demonstration did not attempt to extinguish the fire.  
Case 9: Report to the University of Hawaii at Manoa on the Hydrogen/Oxygen Explosion of 
March 16, 2016 
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An incident with devastating consequences occurred at the Manoa campus of the 
University of Hawaii. At the Hawaii Natural Energy Institute (HNEI), research on renewable 
energy sources and energy integration is conducted. The laboratory that was involved in the 
accident focused on using hydrogen, oxygen and carbon dioxide for the green production of 
biofuels and bioplastics. For this purpose, the laboratory used knallgas bacteria. Those microbes 
can capture the energy from the reaction between hydrogen and oxygen. The knallgas bacteria 
were cultured in an open gas system with continuous gas flow. Flow rates for hydrogen, oxygen, 
and carbon dioxide were controlled by mass flow meters. The gases were mixed rapidly in a gas 
proportioner and sparged through the bacterial culture. Unused gas exited out of the bioreactor 
into the fume hood. The laboratory procedure was performed since 2013 using various types of 
bioreactors at 1-3 atm. The postdoctoral researcher who was involved in the accident came to the 
laboratory in October 2015 to develop a closed gas system bioreactor for avoiding the waste of 
gases.  She was trained in the preparation of gas mixtures using a 1-gallon pressure vessel. The 
vessel was used regularly to supply small scale liquid and petri dish bacteria cell cultures at a 
pressure of 2 atm. The set up was used for 8 months without incidents. The protocol of the 
experiment as well as necessary changes were discussed in weekly meetings by the principal 
investigator and the postdoctoral researcher. To streamline the research process using the closed 
gas system bioreactor, the researchers decided to scale-up the procedure by pre-mixing the gases 
in a new 13-gallon storage tank. A risk analysis for using the tank with hydrogen and oxygen 
was not documented.  The tank arrived in December 2015 and was leak-tested in January of 
2016. From the beginning of February until March 16, 2016, the gas storage tank was filled 
eleven times with the gas mixture. Each filling contained gas mixtures in the explosive range 
with pressures from 37 to 117 psi. The PI and post-doctoral researcher assumed the process to be 
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safe since they stayed well below the maximum pressure for the storage tank (140 psi). A 
laboratory inspection was performed in January 2016; however, the use of gas storage tanks was 
not questioned because the inspection used a standardized checklist for chemical laboratories. 
Items for the inspection were chemical waste, gas cylinder storage, laboratory fume hood 
certification, documentation, and training.  On the day before the accident, the postdoctoral 
research noticed a “cracking sound” inside of the 1-gallon pressure vessel. She reported this to 
her principle investigator. This occurred when the postdoctoral researcher depressed the on/off 
button of the vessel’s digital gauge. As she opened the vessel, the researcher found the Petri 
dishes cracked inside. The gauge had been added to the experimental set-up in February 2016 
because it had a smaller error range than the previous gauge. The gauge was not rated as 
intrinsically safe. After she had reported the incident to the primary investigator, he strongly 
advised her not to use the vessel again. On March 16, 2016, the post-doctoral researcher had 
filled the 13-gallon gas storage tank for the eleventh time and was ready to reconnect it to the 
bioreactor. As she pushed the On/Off button of the pressure gauge on the tank, it exploded and 
caused severe injuries to the postdoctoral researcher and caused extensive damage to the 
laboratory, the adjacent laboratories, and the hallways. The pressure gauge on the gas storage 
tank was of the same model as the one that had previously malfunctioned for the 1-gallon vessel. 
Weeks before the accident, the postdoctoral researcher had also reported being electrically 
shocked when touching the pressure vessel of the gas tank. There were no blast barriers and the 
researcher did not wear any type of personal protective equipment during the time of the 
incident. After this incident, UH Manoa established a safety committee to review experiments 
that involve highly hazardous substances or processes. The committee is faculty-led and consists 
of EHS personnel and experienced faculty members who have knowledge in various sectors. 
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Furthermore, HNEI created a laboratory safety walkthrough guide to assist researchers with 
laboratory safety compliance (Merlic, Ngai, Schroeder & Smith, 2016). 
 
Figure 21. Bowtie of University of Hawaii incident. 
Discussion. For the researchers at the Hawaii National Energy Institute, it would have 
been especially important to do an extensive risk assessment and to implement barriers that are 
effectively protecting the workers from the hazards posed by hydrogen, oxygen, and the knallgas 
bacteria. They should have checked and performed maintenance on the pressure vessels 
frequently. Ignoring the fact that a cracking sound was noticeable and broken Petri dishes were 
found inside one day before the incident occurred should have been enough reason to stop using 
all of the vessels that were the same model. The postdoctoral had reported that she had been 
electrically shocked when she touched the pressure vessel that exploded later for the incident. It 
is unclear if the postdoctoral researcher failed to inform the principal investigator of the issues or 
if they both made the wrong assumption that it was safe to continue with the processes that 
involved using the pressured vessel. There were no blast barriers in the laboratory and the 
postdoctoral researcher did not wear proper personal protective equipment while the explosion 
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occurred. These are two examples of failing mitigative barriers. Another notable issue for this 
case was that a previously performed laboratory safety inspection did not involve a review of the 
work processes that used pressured vessels. They had used a standardized check-list for the audit 
which did not include questions about the pressurized storage tanks. A standard operating 
procedure should be composed for every method that is performed at laboratory locations. This 
collection of documents, which usually includes safety data sheets, certificates of analysis, 
manuals for the equipment, and records about calibrations and maintenance, can serve as a good 
basis for a job hazard analysis. When the risk is unacceptably high, effective hazard controls 
need to be implemented immediately.  
Case 10: Case study – A two-liter pyridine spill in an undergraduate laboratory 
An incident occurred on the Tuesday before Thanksgiving at Augustana University in Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota. On that day, three laboratory sessions were held: Medicinal Chemistry, 
General Chemistry, and Organic Chemistry. A student who was enrolled in Medicinal Chemistry 
and who had been a stockroom assistant for more than a year walked through the organic 
chemistry laboratory to the chemical stockroom. He wanted to retrieve 10 mL of pyridine for his 
experiment. He put the four-liter bottle down at an angle on a benchtop in the stockroom. This 
was when the bottle cracked in half diagonally. Two liters were spilled onto the student, the 
benchtop and the floor of the stockroom. He tried to call for help several times, but nobody 
responded. He eventually caught the attention of the organic chemistry instructor and two senior 
lab assistants. One of the lab assistants later stated that the student seemed to be disoriented 
maybe due to the pyridine vapors. Before anyone was able to help him, the student proceeded 
down the hallway and down the stairs to a private shower, where he took off his clothes and then 
washed the affected areas with water. Two male faculty members were there in less than a 
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minute and assisted the student.  The student initially stated that the affected skin felt a little 
‘‘strange’’, but after the shower, he stopped feeling any discomfort. The student also said he felt 
nauseated right after the spill happened, but after one day, he felt no ill effects. The student was 
brought to a local hospital, where a physician examined him and he and was deemed to be 
physically unaffected. He was prescribed antibiotics and moisture cream for the affected skin 
areas. The student was monitored over Thanksgiving break and showed no acute health effects 
from the exposure to the pyridine. While the student was assisted, the situation at the location 
evolved as followed: Since the student exited through the organic chemistry lab, the whole class 
was aware of what happened, and the students quickly evacuated. However, the instructor and 
the students of the general chemistry lab were not aware of the situation for some time, even 
though the students had begun to smell the pyridine and became nauseated. 
The instructor left the student assistants in charge and went to assist the situation. Due to the 
smell, the student moved to the other side of the room. They did not want to leave without their 
instructor. The students continued to be nauseated by the smell and were then evacuated from the 
room. At first, the stockroom manager tried to contain the spill with sodium bicarbonate but 
could not finish the task because of the intense smell of the pyridine. People in other parts of the 
building started to smell the pyridine and were evacuated within 15 minutes. Even though the 
faculty had experience with spill clean-ups, they were not able to clean up the spill because it 
was too large. The Sioux Falls Fire Department Hazardous Materials Team was called to 
investigate and help with the cleanup. Because they had not encountered a pyridine spill before, 
they were very cautious and heavily relied on the knowledge of the chemistry faculty. The 
pyridine spill was 4 feet in diameter. The laboratory fume hood was left on and the windows of 
the chemical stockroom were opened. After a few moments, the Hazardous Materials Team 
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concluded that using electronic sensors, the concentration of volatile organic compounds 
(VOC’s) was low enough to enter the room. It was determined that the best solution was to let 
the ventilation system of the science building take care of the vapor over the Thanksgiving break. 
After returning from Thanksgiving break, it was recognized that there was very little odor in the 
building, and it was safe to resume normal operations. The only remaining issue was the amount 
of pyridine that was bound to the sodium bicarbonate matrix. There was initially no plan for who 
would clean up the spill. A faculty member with an auto-immune disease cleaned up the spill 
together with two other faculty members. They felt fine initially but became nauseated after a 
few hours and went home for the day. A follow-up safety committee meeting was called and the 
incident, as well as protocol changes, were discussed. As a summary, the author mentioned that 
pyridine was not particularly dangerous and just the intense smell was the reason for the 
evacuation of the building (Eichler, 2016).  
 
Figure 22. Bowtie of pyridine spill incident. 
Discussion. Pyridine is a suspected human carcinogen and can have severe short-term 
and long-term health effects. The substance can influence the central nervous system and a self-
contained breathing apparatus is recommended for the handling of pyridine. The OSHA time-
weighted average is 5 ppm (15 mg/m3). Pyridine is a highly flammable substance and an 
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environmental toxin (Pubchem, n. d.). The author made the wrong assumption that pyridine was 
not particularly dangerous at the end of the publication. Several of the people that were involved 
in the incident seemed to have a similar opinion. A student, who also was as a stockroom 
assistant, had unrestricted access to chemicals and handled large amounts of pyridine. He was 
alone in the laboratory while the spill occurred. It took several minutes until the incident was 
noticed and medical assistance was provided. The student used a safety shower that was located 
relatively far from the laboratory.  Not all students evacuated the building immediately because 
the students and the faculty member that were in session for the general chemistry laboratory 
were not notified. When those individuals started to smell the pyridine, the instructor left the 
student assistants in charge and only after a prolonged exposure to the chemical, the group was 
evacuated. The whole building was evacuated after 15 minutes. Meanwhile, the stockroom 
manager attempted to clean up the spill and noticed it was too large. The windows of the 
laboratory were opened which could have introduced additional oxygen that could have served 
as a fuel source if there had been a fire. This situation clearly shows that Augusta University did 
not have an adequate alarm system and emergency response plan. As the fire department arrived, 
it had to rely on the knowledge of the chemistry faculty. Information about CAS-registered 
chemicals is nowadays readily available because manufacturers are required to provide safety 
data sheets of their products. Pyridine is an EPA-regulated substance; therefore, it was a very 
questionable decision to have it evaporate over the holidays. The faculty member with the 
autoimmune disease should not have cleaned up the residues of the chemical that were still found 
after the Thanksgiving weekend. Augusta University should have instead communicated the 
remaining issue to the local authorities so that a coordinated cleanup, performed by trained 
hazardous material technicians, could have been initiated.  
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Case 11: Case study: Reaction scale-up leads to incident involving bromine and acetone 
This publication describes an incident that was caused by a reaction scale-up involving acetone 
and bromine. An experienced postdoctoral researcher modified a published procedure for the 
deintercalating sodium from a metal oxide. He included the use of acetone in a final workup step. 
The published procedure called for the preparation of a fresh 6 M bromine solution in 
acetonitrile. The starting material that consisted of sodium, cobalt and antimony oxides was 
combined with the bromine/ acetonitrile mixture. After 24 hours of stirring, the substrate was 
vacuum filtered through a Buchner funnel and washed several times with water. The scale for the 
procedure usually consisted of 500 to 800 mg of solid substrate and 16 mL of the bromine/ 
acetonitrile mixture. The new washing step involved 5-8 mL of acetone instead of water. The 
researcher did this several times without any incident. Due to the success of this protocol, the 
researcher scaled up the experiment. He was working inside of a fume hood whose sash was at 
the maximum recommended operation height of about 18 inches. He mixed 3 g of the solid 
substrate with 15 mL of 6M bromine/acetonitrile mixture. During the first attempt, as soon as he 
added the acetone to the mixture on the Buchner funnel, the content on the vacuum flask reacted 
violently which resulted in an expulsion of gases and liquids on the body of the researcher and 
the surrounding areas. The content of the vacuum flask sprayed on the hands, arms, torso, and 
face of the researcher. He was wearing a flame-resistant laboratory coat, safety glasses, and 
nitrile gloves when the incident occurred. After the researcher was exposed to the mixture, he 
removed the laboratory coat and the long-sleeved shirt. He went to the nearest safety shower and 
briefly rinsed off without removing other clothing. Due to the fumes, the researcher proceeded to 
an eye wash station in an adjacent laboratory. A graduate student assisted the researcher while he 
was rinsing his face and eyes for 10 to 12 minutes. The standard protocol called for at least 15 
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minutes. The researcher did not appear to have chemical exposure to any skin areas besides his 
face. The liquid had sprayed on his face and run under the safety glasses into both eyes. He was 
taken to the hospital and treated for first degree burns. He was released on the same day. The 
incident happened on a Friday. After a follow-up medical examination on the following Monday, 
he was cleared to return to work (Chance, 2016). 
 
Figure 23. Bowtie of bromine/acetone incident. 
Discussion. This incident is very similar to the first case that was discussed in this 
chapter. A synthesis that involved acetone and bromine was scaled up, the mixture reacted 
violently, and gases and liquids were expulsed on the researcher and the surrounding areas. The 
intentional scale-up of the synthesis was a deviation from the standard protocol that cannot be 
justified by the effectiveness of the procedure. The researcher was wearing proper personal 
protective equipment and used a safety shower immediately after the incident. However, he went 
to an adjacent laboratory and used the eyewash station there. It can be assumed that there had not 
been a functioning eyewash station in the laboratory room where the incident had occurred. The 
researcher did not comply with the standard protocol of rinsing the eyes for at least 15 minutes. 
A potential solution to prevent similar accidents could be restricting access to chemicals. If the 
substances are in a centralized storage area, it could be arranged that the researchers are just able 
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to request the amounts of chemicals that were official approved by a chemical safety committee. 
If changes for a procedure are proposed, a new risk assessment needs to be performed. Changes 




The results of this comparative case study research project show that academic and 
primary educational laboratory facilities need to improve in the areas of training, risk 
management, and communication. Table 5 displays an overview of failing barriers for the eleven 
cases included to the project. Most of the facilities had deficiencies for training, SOPs, 
engineering controls, and emergency response. Failing communications and a lack of equipment 
monitoring were common themes as well. 
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Total 4 2 1 8 3 2 4 3 7 2 
  
For any facilities, it is important to do a risk assessment before starting a new experiment 
or doing any alterations to the standard protocol. The visual method of the bowtie can serve as a 
tool to illustrate undesired incidents in the chemistry laboratory. It makes it very easy to mind-
map possible threads and consequences around the top event that can be caused by a hazard 
present in the laboratory. Non-functional barriers can create several paths that can lead to an 
undesired incident. Potential threats can come from multiple sources and can therefore not be 
controlled with a linear risk management model. The bowtie diagram, in fact, shows that 
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hierarchical models of risk management are not very accurate for fluid work environments. 
Barriers that include administrative controls, engineering controls, and personal protective 
equipment can fail. Work processes that are frequently changing call for risk management 
concept that can adjust if the dynamics of the system require it.  When there is no written 
standard operating procedure, people will make decisions based on assumptions and 
memorization, and not on facts. This can have horrific consequences. A certain standard for 
laboratory procedures needs to be established. The standard operating procedure then serves as a 
guideline for people that are learning the methodology. At the same time, an experienced 
technician, staff member, or the principal investigator for the research project needs to observe 
the trainee while they are performing the method for the first few times. As soon as a working 
routine was established, the trainee may perform the procedure but has to communicate if they 
need to make an adjustment or alteration of the method, since this may require additional risk 
controls. However, safety training and SOPs that are implemented as barriers can only be 
effective when the employees have a positive attitude towards safety and will follow the rules 
and regulation in all situations. It was already discussed in the literature that human error is too 
often identified as the cause of undesired incidents. Rather than focusing on the “sharp end” 
(work level) of the risk management framework, the whole system needs to be monitored and 
communications between the different levels of the work hierarchy need to be improved (Dallat, 
Salmon & Goode, 2017). An excellent way to improve communications for an organization or 
institution is establishing safety committees that include representatives from all work levels. 
During their frequent meetings, experts and professionals working at the different areas of the 
organization can discuss safety concerns and evaluate procedures. The goal is to keep safety a 
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priority and to effectively communicate knowledge about hazards and risks. Ultimately, it might 




While educational and academic institutions display the characteristics of a business in 
many aspects of their operations, they are not able to compete with businesses and industries 
when it comes to occupational health and safety. Safety education and training of students, 
faculty, and staff who are present at the laboratories of the primary educational facilities and 
academic institutions, need to be improved significantly. All people need to develop a proactive 
mindset and a positive attitude toward safety. Over time, this will not only reduce the frequency 
of undesired hazardous events and be more cost-efficient but, will also help to create a generative 
safety culture for the next generation. Undesired incidents can provide learning opportunities and 
it is very important that subsequent investigations not only focus on the mistakes that were made 
at the work level but also how the risk management framework failed to adapt to the unexpected 
situations. What students learn about safety during the years of their education will also later 
benefit the people they are collaborating with as professionals. This requires independent and 
proactive thinking as well as a general awareness of the work situation and the surroundings. The 
first step must be that administrators, educators, and students, acknowledge that there cannot be a 
single guideline that covers all the hazards and risks that are associated with chemicals and 
laboratory work practices. In order to become more effective learning environments for the next 
generation new teaching methods on how to successfully incorporate safety training to the 
curriculum need to be explored. All people that are involved in the processes at the facilities 
need to gain knowledge about the different aspects of occupational safety. They need to include 
safe practices as an integral part of their daily work routine. This can be accomplished by making 
safety a core component of the curriculum and an evaluation requirement for both educators and 
students. Submitting a Job Hazard Analysis together with their laboratory reports and research 
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proposals would provide students with the opportunity to gain more knowledge in safe 
laboratory practices. As they gain experiences, students will eventually become confident and are 
going to be able to evaluate hazardous situations in an informed manner. At the same time, 
procedures being performed at research and teaching laboratories should be observed by trained 
safety professionals. They can then make recommendations on how to implement or adjust safety 
barriers.  This will not guarantee that zero incidents happen in the future. However, if safety 
becomes a core value of the academic and educational world, undesired incidents will hopefully 
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